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At a time when the United Nations is playing a decisive role in coping with world problems which affect the lives of millions of people, fair play - a combination of observance of the rules, respect for the defenceless, and prevention of adverse behaviour - is the condition under which human cooperation becomes both possible and necessary.

With a view to this, to help these essential features cross the arbitrary and artificial barriers to realize the UN's potential as a positive force in the world, UNJustice devotes itself to no other task with more dedication than to the very task it got its name from: encouraging fair play in the United Nations system of administration of justice.

"An Essay on the Accountability of International Organizations"

8 September 2010

Dr Matthew Parish is a visiting fellow at the British Institute of International and Comparative Law and international lawyer. His most recent publication, An Essay on the Accountability of International Organizations, is an insightful analysis on why legal accountability can make international organizations more effective "in pursuing their proper goals and avoiding waste and aberration." The essay is to be published in the International Organizations Law Review Vol. 7(2) (2010).

You will find the abstract below and can download the full text available form the Social Science Research Network (SSRN) by clicking here [PDF-445 KB].

An Essay on the Accountability of International Organizations

By Matthew Parish 

Abstract:      
International organizations sometimes suffer from acute agency problems. Three exogenous methods of addressing those problems are considered: economic incentives, political accountability and legal accountability. For international organizations, the first is undesirable and the second inevitably weak. There is therefore an argument for heightened legal scrutiny of their actions. Yet international organizations have an unenviable track record of acting without regard to the most fundamental international standards of rule of law, and this article offers an unsightly catalogue of their legal aberrations. Moreover, the internal legal mechanisms international organizations have created ostensibly to hold themselves to account prove wanting at best. There may also be structural reasons why international courts and tribunals will never be able to conduct an adequate review of the important decisions international organizations routinely take. This makes those organizations’ assertions of blanket legal immunity from jurisdiction of domestic courts appear increasingly inexplicable, as it removes all possibility of legal accountability. The supposed rationales for legal immunities of international organizations are reviewed and proved wanting. The conclusion drawn is that international organizations should be subjected to radically improved regimes of international judicial oversight, or their immunities should be abrogated in certain areas so that they may be rendered subject to the jurisdiction of the domestic courts of the countries in which they operate, or both. Measures of this kind may dramatically improve the quality of decision-making and accountability of international organizations.